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PRIVATE TRANSFERS, INFORMAL LOANS AND RIKS SHARING AMONG
POOR URBAN HOUSEHOLDS
I. Introduction
The average household in the poor regions of the world is often faced with consumption
risks that result from income and related shocks. In rural areas, such shocks include
weather calamities that negatively affect crop production, adverse price shocks, loss of
crops to pests, sickness or death of the household head or other working members,
unexpected ceremonial expenses etc. In urban areas, income swings are often associated
with the incidence and duration of unemployment, sickness of earning members and
impending medical expenses, flailing business income for business operating households
etc. Accordingly, while households in both rural and urban areas may be exposed to
certain common types of shocks, some other risks can be peculiar to the social, livelihood
and production structures prevailing in the specific community. Nevertheless, faced with
various sources of income risk, it is reasonable that households strive to protect
consumption through different means, formal or informal, and across time and space.
The question of how well households cope with and share risk has been at the forefront of
the risk-sharing literature, mostly in the context of rural areas of developing economies.
But most of the empirical tests have been aggregate, consumption based (see for
example, Townsend, 1994; Deaton, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). The hypothesis in
these tests is that if households efficiently share risk, controlling for aggregate
community income, changes in individual income should not have a significant effect on
consumption. The particular mechanism(s) (or instruments) that households adopt for
risk-sharing purposes is not apparent from such an approach (see Alderman and Paxson,
1994; Cox and Jimenez, 1998; Fafcahmps and Lund, 2003, for similar observations).
Knowledge of the actual means of insurance used by households, which are likely to be
informal in nature for most poor regions of the world, has policy relevance of multiple
dimensions. For instance, if interhousehold transfers and informal loans are the primary
means through which households cope with risk, and they are found to be reasonably
efficient, it may be the case that public insurance programs simply substitute these
mechanisms with little or no gain in net social welfare. In fact, given the informational
advantages that such households have (in assessing the magnitude and source of risk)
relative to an outside principal, public insurance may even be less efficient.
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On the other hand, if appropriate tests reveal that households self-insure through, say,
accumulation of liquid and non-liquid assets, and that only relatively wealthy households
are able to do so, targeted public insurance for the liquidity-constrained poor households
may be efficiency-enhancing.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that investigates the mechanisms of risksharing among poor households. There are two aspects of the paper that are particularly
relevant in the context of the literature. First, it focuses on poor urban areas. The
disproportionate focus in the literature on rural households has meant that we know
relatively little about the risk-sharing practices of poor urban households. Given that
formal insurance is largely absent even in urban areas of most developing economies, it is
apparent that these households may be no less vulnerable to income risk than their rural
counterparts. Furthermore, because of lack of survey data, the little we know about risk
sharing between poor urban households has come from small, targeted surveys. The use
of a nationally representative urban survey data in this study is particularly appealing in
this regard.1 Second, the study uses information on both private transfer and informal
loan activities to assess whether each mechanism serves risk sharing purposes. The
simultaneous treatment of both potential instruments sheds light on relative performance,
and also highlights idiosyncrasies that affect household participation in either (or both)
mechanisms. It has been argued in the literature that if households are motivated by
altruism, private transfers in the form of pure gifts are the primary means through which
risk-sharing occurs. However, if enforcement problems are pronounced, informal credit
with contingent repayment may be used to realize self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts
(Fafchamps, 1999). Fafchamps and Lund (2003) argue that such enforcement problems
are the reason behind their finding that informal loans (quasi-credit), and not gifts and
transfers, perform risk-sharing functions in rural Filipino networks.
The literature has noted that, in the absence of formal insurance, poor households often
devise various means of pooling risk. It has been documented that within and interhousehold transfers in the form of remittances and gifts are used for consumption
smoothing purposes by rural households in Botswana and India (Lucas and Stark, 1985;
Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Rosenzweig, 1988). Informal loans with zero or small
interest, no collateral and contingent repayment serve insurance purposes in the face of
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Recent studies of East European economies have used survey data (see for instance, Skoufias, 2003 and
Skoufias, 2004 for Russia and Bulgaria, respectively).
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shocks and income variability (Udry, 1990, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).
Households also accumulate savings and assets to run down in times of uncertainty and
hardship (Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). In other evidence, households
engage in income smoothing activities prior to the occurrence of shocks. Examples of
such measures include crop diversification and choice of low return-low risk varieties by
farming households (Dercon, 1996) and involvement in off-farm activities (Kochar,
1999; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Labor and resource sharing is still another route
households take to help each other in times of need (Platteau, 1997).
The nuances of urban living imply that risk-sharing in poor urban areas can be a
distinctly different exercise than that in rural areas. Cox and Jimenez (1998) argue that it
is difficult to judge a priori whether poor urban settings suit risk-sharing practices better
than rural ones. Proximity and relative occupational uniformity significantly mitigate
information problems in rural areas and promote risk-sharing arrangements. However,
these same characteristics imply that rural households are subject to the same aggregate
risk, which renders risk-sharing ineffective, while urban households are not. Urban risksharing, in contrast, is infected with significant moral hazard problems, even more so
because of the relatively loose social structure that worsens information problems. Which
way risk-sharing performance sways is therefore an empirical question.
The data reveal that transfers and loans in urban Ethiopia are largely informal, often
transacted between relatives and friends. They are also primarily used to augment
nondurable (especially food) consumption, supporting the hypothesis that they may be
among the main instruments of consumption smoothing. The regression results further
show that private transfers in urban Ethiopia significantly respond to presumed proxies of
income risk. Unemployment of the head, female headship and in some cases sickness
increase the probability of net transfer receipts. In contrast, informal loans do not seem to
respond to any of these shocks. This latter result may imply that such loans, though
informal, have very much the characteristics of formal loans where repayment
considerations factor in to determine flow patterns; hence nullifying their potential use as
instruments of insurance. The results suggest that altruistically motivated transfers,
compared to informal loans, better serve risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia.
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II. Data
2.1. Source
The data for the analyses in this paper come from the Ethiopian Urban Socio-Economic
Surveys (EUSES) conducted by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University,
Ethiopia in collaboration with various national and international institutions.2The
nationally representative surveys collect extensive information on household
demographics, employment and income, consumption, migration, transfer and credit
activity, health and welfare from households residing in seven major urban centers in the
country. Each urban center is allocated a share of participant households in the survey
according to its contribution to the total population. Accordingly, while Addis Ababa (the
capital city), Dire-Dawa and Awassa were allocated 900, 125 and 75 households,
respectively, the other four cities (Bahir-Dar, Dessie, Jimma and Mekele) each
contributed 100 households. Four rounds of the survey conducted between 1994 and
2000 are available to date.
For the current study, we use data from the first three rounds of the survey, collected in
September 1994, November 1995 and January 1997. These rounds have a strong panel
structure, tracking the same households whenever possible. In constructing our sample,
we dropped households that reported operating formal businesses. We believe that such
households have a structurally different income source composition and attitude towards
risk from the average household.3 Regardless, the random sampling ensures that all
income groups are represented in our sample. After data cleaning and dropping
households with missing values for important variables, the final sample for this study
consists of 2504 observations. This final sample derives information from 1202
households, each household contributing at most 3 observations, whenever available.
The unit of analysis for the current study is the household. However, the design of the
surveys is such that most of the relevant questions were asked at the member level. As a
result, enormous aggregations were required to arrive at household level values for
important variables like income, private transfers and informal loans.
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The Collaborating institutions are Institute of Development Research, Ethiopia (1994 round); the then
Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Ethiopia and Michigan State University (1995
round); University of Goteborg, Sweden (1994, 1997 and 2000 rounds).
3
Since pre-transfer income and activity choice are considered exogenous for our analysis, this will not
cause a sample selection problem.
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2.2. Private Transfers and Informal Loans
As noted above, the primary objective of this paper is to investigate whether private
transfers and informal loans serve as instruments of risk-sharing among poor urban
households. We focus on these mechanisms for two reasons. First, public insurance and
formal credit services (especially for consumption related purposes) are barely available
in poor urban economies. Second, since revealing (and verifying) vulnerability to
consumption risk is generally difficult, closely-knit relationships that can resolve the
associated moral hazard and adverse selection problems provide potentially thriving
means of insurance.
We define private transfers and informal loans primarily based the source of receipts.
Transactions that take place with resident and non-resident household members, friends,
relatives, neighbors etc. are considered private (informal) and are included for analysis.
Local administrations, the government and non-governmental organizations (for
transfers), and banks and credit associations (for loans) constitute formal sources and the
associated transactions are excluded for the purposes of this paper. The amounts analyzed
include both cash and value of in-kind transfers and loans.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on participation in private transfer and informal loan
activities by urban households in Ethiopia. Statistics on amounts of transfers and loans
conditional on participation are also presented. The transfer and loan summaries are
based on activities in the 12 months prior to the survey month. The income statistics refer
to monthly amounts. The figures in the table show that about 31% of households in the
sample reported involvement in some type of transfer activity; a third of the sample
reported participation in similar loan exchange (as recipients, givers or both; figures refer
to the pooled sample). The participation statistics reveal that households are much more
likely to receive than give transfers. This is even more so the case for loans. Average
annual net transfer receipts (defined as transfers received minus transfers given) amount
to 3.5 times mean monthly income. The comparable figures for loans are much less,
however, whereby the mean annual net loan receipt (defined as loans received-loans
repaid-loans given+ repayments received) is about half of average monthly household
income.4 While most of the participation figures are comparable across years, the average
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If we assume net receipts are evenly distributed across months, average monthly transfer and loan receipts
represent 30% and 5% of average monthly income, respectively.
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transfer and loan magnitudes for 1995 are remarkably smaller than those for 1994 and
1997. The relatively large standard deviations accompanying the means also show that
there is a large degree of variation in income, transfer and loan flows between
households.5
Sources of private transfers and informal loans are summarized in Table 2. As the
responses to the transfer and loan questions were recorded at the member level, the
statistics are based on receipts by individuals residing in the final sample of households.
It is shown that an overwhelming majority of transfers involve inter-household
transactions among relatives and friends. ‘Other’ (consisting of dowry, inheritances and
unspecified) sources contribute less than 1% of total transfer receipts.6 The same is true
for loan receipts; 80% of loan exchange takes place between friends, relatives or
neighbors. Informal networks—referred to as equb and iddir/mahber, rotating savings
and credit and insurance associations, respectively—are sources to less than 3% of total
loan receipts.7
A summary of the reasons for transfer and loan receipts is presented in Table 3. Again
these statistics are based on available responses by residents in the final sample of
households. More than 2/3 of private transfer receipts by urban households in Ethiopia
are intended for food consumption. Similarly, based on counts, about 47% of informal
loans are used to augment food consumption. In case of loan receipts, however, the
weighted statistics show that loans taken for nonfood-nondurable consumption (like
educational, health, travel and rental expenses, etc.) are much larger in magnitude than
those intended for food consumption.
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 reveal that private transfers and informal loans indeed serve
consumption smoothing purposes. Our a priori that the scarcity of formal sources of
insurance and credit, and the informational advantages that are present in closely-knit
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The median income is 189.82 Birr. The median net transfer and loan amount is 400 and 0 Birr,
respectively. The reason behind the 0 median value for net credit receipts is that an interestingly large
(16%) of households reported fully repaying loans taken (or getting full repayments for loans extended)
during the year.
6
Given that the focus is on private transfers, those from governmental and non-governmental
organizations, which often take the form of food aid, are excluded from the analysis. In the original sample,
such transfers amounted to about 13% of total transfer receipts.
7
In a similar manner, since the focus here is on informal loans, formal loan receipts are excluded from the
analysis. However, a look at the original sample shows that loans from formal sources like banks and credit
associations contribute to a very small proportion (about 8%) of total loans receipts.
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relationships, may compel households to resort to reliance on private transfers and
informal loans as instruments of insurance seems to be borne out. In the next section, we
further examine the issue based on regression analysis.
III. Specification
This section investigates, using econometric evidence, whether households in poor urban
areas share risk through the use of private transfers and informal loans. The hypothesis is
that if households use either or both potential channels of informal insurance, net positive
flows should occur to households experiencing negative income shocks. In this regard,
one would ideally like to obtain a measure of (unexpected, transitory) income variability
and examine its correlation with the direction of net transfer and loan flows. Given the
available information in the EUSES and that we only have at most three data points per
household, we are not able to generate an exogenous measure of income risk to include as
an explanatory variable.8
Lack of a direct measure of income variability may be a caveat of the study. However, we
argue that it is also very difficult for partnering households to reveal (and verify) the
nature of idiosyncratic income variations. That is, income changes per se may be poor
signals for risk-sharing purposes anyway, and are unlikely to determine transfer and loan
flows, if indeed the latter serve risk-sharing practices. This is especially true for urban
areas. While households in rural areas can fairly objectively assess the seasonal harvests
of a neighboring farming household, the varied occupational undertakings by urban
households imply a similar exercise is likely to be difficult.9
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In the welfare section of the surveys, households were asked to give the nature/direction of income change
that they have experienced (within the past three years for the 1994 round, and since the previous survey
for the 1995 and 1997 rounds). Unfortunately, the definition of ‘income’ in the respective question is not
clear, and it is worrisome that households could impute net transfer, loan and other unearned income in
their subjective calculation of income change. We experimented with the use of the variable as a proxy for
income shocks, but our worry seems to have been proven in that the estimated coefficient had the ‘wrong
sign’ (i.e. positive income changes were positively correlated with net transfer receipts) and was not
statistically significant in almost all specifications.
9
A similar comparison between urban and rural households can be made when it comes to the difficulty
involving revelation and verification of effort in production. This problem is potentially much more severe
in urban areas because of the large variations in employment types and human capital. A similar point was
made by Cox and Jimenez (1998). The relatively loose societal structure in urban compared to rural areas is
another reason for a more significant moral hazard problem.
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Consequently, we argue that, empirically, transfer and loan flows may be dictated more
by readily observable signals of vulnerability to consumption risk than idiosyncratic
income changes.10 Such signals constitute age composition of a household, female
headship, employment status, number of working members, health status etc. The
hypothesis is that if private transfers and loans fulfill risk-sharing purposes between
urban households, those households exhibiting characteristics that are often positively
correlated with vulnerability to consumption risk are more likely to be net recipients,
ceteris paribus.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate separate incidence equations for transfer and loan
receipts.11 The explanatory variables that are used in the estimations are summarized in
Table 4. The statistics reveal that the average household in the sample consists of 5.7
members. A somewhat surprisingly large proportion (42%) of households were female
headed, while the mean age of heads was about 49 years12. Heads have 5 years of
schooling on average, while the mean years of schooling of all members above 15 years
of age is 6.7 years. A fifth of heads were unemployed. A similar proportion reported
having disabilities half of which are chronic. About 15% of heads reported experiencing
sickness in the four weeks prior to survey date (see Appendix for definition and
construction of variables).
We argue that female headship, head’s unemployment, head’s disability, number of
workers and, to some extent, head’s sickness are relatively conspicuous signals of
vulnerability to income shocks. Number of workers potentially shows income source
diversification and increased ability to self-insure. Female headship and head’s disability
signal the opposite. Unemployment and sickness of the head reveal negative income
shocks. Controlling for number of workers, household size shows increased consumption
needs. We control for age and human capital composition of the household to capture for
liquidity constraint and life-cycle effects (see Cox et al, 1998, 2004, among others). Pre-
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This is more true for transfers. If informal loans are pure credit, repayment considerations factor in to
determine flow patterns.
11
OLS estimation using the amount of transfers and loans resulted in statistically insignificant coefficients
in most cases. In comparison, as is often the case in the literature, the coefficients in incidence equations
are much better determined (see for example, Cox and Jimenez, 1998, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004).
12
A potential explanation for the large proportion of female headed households is that many women may
have experienced separations from or death of husbands in the prolonged civil war that ended in 1991. It
has also been noted that reintegration of ex-soldiers has been difficult in urban compared to rural areas
(Dercon and Ayalew, 1998).
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transfer income is the main variable scrutinized in the motives for transfer—altruism
versus exchange—debate in the literature (Cox, 1987; Altonji et al., 1997).
Based on the categorization of households into three groups—as net givers, neither net
givers nor net recipients, and net recipients—we estimate an ordered probit model for

transfers and loans separately. Assume that z h represents the latent variable that
determines the transfer (loan) net receipt status of household h . The latent variable z h is
given by a linear function:
zh  X h    h ,

where X h denotes a vector of household characteristics and shock proxies,  represents
a vector of regression coefficients, and  h denotes an error term which is assumed to be
distributed standard normal.
Assume Z h represents the observed categorical variable for transfer (loan) net receipt
status. Z h is then related to the latent variable z h according to the following:

Z h  1 if zh  1 ,
Z h  0 if 1  zh   2 , and
Z h  1 if z h   2 .
Z h  1 , Z h  0 and Z h  1 represent net giver, neither net recipient nor net giver, and
net recipient status, respectively. The cut-off points (  ’s) are estimated along with the
regression parameters (Maddala, 1983; Long, 1997).
Distribution of the pooled estimation sample based on net transfer (loan) receipt status is
presented in Table 5.13It is shown that the proportion of net recipients is significantly
larger than that of net givers. This may show that a few, relatively better-off households
carry a significant burden of responsibility for the provision of transfers and loans. In the
case of transfers, it may also highlight the role played by remittances received from non13

For both transfers and loans, the pooled sample reflects a very similar distribution to the ones obtained
for the cross-section of households (i.e. by year). The proportion of net recipients of transfers is comparable
to what other studies that rely on national survey have reported (see for example, Cox et al, 1998, for urban
Peru, and Kuhn and Stillman, 2004 for urban Russia). Using Philippines data for private transfers, Cox et al
(2004) present a much larger proportion of households that are net recipients (about 80%), but net givers
accounted for about 10% of the sample.
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domestic sources. For the third category of households that are neither net givers nor net
recipients, we do not distinguish between households that were not involved in receiving
and/or giving at all and those that have net zero values because of canceling out. This is
especially noteworthy in case of loans because, as noted earlier, 16% of observations that
belong to this category were involved in loan activities but have fully paid loans taken (or
received full payments for loans given). This provides further evidence that households
may indeed use informal loans to relieve transitory negative pressures on income and
consumption.
IV. Results
The ordered probit estimates are presented in Table 6a. We first discuss the results for the
estimations done on the pooled sample. The estimates for the transfer equation show that
female headship and head’s unemployment increase the likelihood of being a net transfer
recipient while number of workers/earners in the household decreases it. Increase in
income also makes households less likely to be net recipients. Household size, head’s age
and human capital composition have no effect on the probability of net receipts.
Similarly, temporal sickness and permanent disability, even chronic, seem to have no
effect.14 In general, the estimates seem to conform to the risk-sharing hypothesis. If
increases in income and number of earners in the family are positively correlated with
household’s ability to self-ensure (and, generally, a more stable income stream), they lead
to a reduced dependence on or need for transfer receipts. Head’s unemployment, which is
a more visible signal for negative pressures on income and consumption, is found to be
positively associated with transfer receipts. The same effect is seen for female headship,
which we argue is a perceived indicator of increased vulnerability to income variability. 15
The estimates for the loan equation show two significant differences to those of the
transfer equation: female headship and head’s unemployment do not affect loan receipts.
Presumably, repayment capacity of potential recipients may be an important determinant
14

Estimations that included regional dummies resulted in almost identical results. Furthermore, as a group,
the regional dummies were never significant.
15
Some studies argue that female headship, by construct, should be highly correlated with transfer receipts
because it shows husbands that have migrated in search of work and remit cash regularly (Cox et al, 2004;
Cox and Jimenez, 1998). This is especially true when considering rural households and countries with
significant international migration (e.g. the Philippines in case of Cox et al, 2004). None of these two is the
case in this study. One may argue that there can be significant migration to the capital city, Addis Ababa,
from the other urban centers. This is not the case either, as the 41% proportion of female headed
households in the capital shows the survey average female headship ratio is typical of all regions.
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of the decision to give (and maybe even to request) loans. Furthermore, household size
has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of loan receipts. Considering that
we are controlling for household income and number of workers, this indicates that
household size may show increased consumption needs and/or additional worth as visible
collateral. Head’s schooling seems to decrease the likelihood of loan receipts, holding
everything else constant. The lack of significant effect of outward income risk proxies
like head’s unemployment and female headship implies that informal loans may not serve
risk-sharing purposes in these areas.
Table 6a also presents results using a random effects ordered probit estimator. This is
performed to check whether the results discussed above are robust to controls for
household heterogeneities. It can be seen that, for both the transfer and loan equations,
the random effects estimates largely follow the trend set by the pooled estimates. The
notable changes when we control for household effects are that household income is no
more statistically significant in the transfer equation and is significant at only 10% level
in the loan equation; and that female headship and unemployment in the transfer equation
have larger effects compared to the pooled estimates. The difference in results is
intuitive. In the risk sharing equation, income should not matter when there are
observable shock variables, and looses its significance as a proxy for other householdspecific effects in the presence of controls for the latter. For loans, however, income
remains relevant (though at the 10% level) because it represents household resources,
which in turn determine the demand for loans for consumption smoothing purposes.

Table 6b presents the marginal effects of the estimates in Table 6a for the select variables
that can be deemed potential outward indicators of household risk and vulnerability in a
poor urban setting. Marginal effects in case of ordered probit estimation are typically
computed as the implied change in probability within each category of status.
Accordingly, Table 6b shows marginal effects for the three respective categories of net
giver ( Z h  1 ), neither net recipient nor net giver ( Z h  0 ) and net recipient ( Z h  1 ).
Because the pooled estimates in Table 6a are typically lower than the random effects
estimates, and also because their marginal effects are computationally easier to calculate,
the reported marginal effects in Table 6b are based on the pooled results. As can be seen
from the marginal effects, female headship and head’s unemployment have economically
significant effects on net transfer receipt status. Female headship increases the likelihood
11

of net transfer recipient status by 10 percentage points, decreases a neutral (neither giver
nor recipient) status by 6.1 percentage points and decreases net giver status by 3.8
percentage points. Similarly, head’s unemployment increases the probability of net
receipts by 10.7 percentage points while decreasing the likelihood of the zero and net
giver categories by 7.1 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. Looking at the variables
with a statistically significant effect in the loan equation, head’s chronic disability
increases the likelihood that a household will be a net recipient of loans by 5.1 percentage
points, while a unit increase in household size raises the probability by 0.8 percentage
points. Number of workers has the opposite effect, decreasing the likelihood by 2.3
percentage points.
To further analyze the determinants of receiving and giving, and examine the presumed
symmetry that should exist, we also estimate separate probit equations for transfer (loan)
receipts and giving. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Again we report pooled
as well as random effects estimates. The results in Table 7 show that female headship,
unemployment and sickness (in the random effects specification) are associated with
larger probability of receiving transfers. Female headship and head’s unemployment raise
the probability of net receipts by 14.5 and 13.8 percentage points, respectively.
Household size causes the probability to decline. Notably, increased head’s schooling
improves the likelihood of transfer receipts. The loan receipt probit results are also shown
in Table 7. As was the case in the ordered probit specification, the income risk proxies
like unemployment, sickness and female head have no effect on the likelihood of loan
receipts. This further confirms that informal loans may not be an effective means of
consumption smoothing for the poor in urban Ethiopia.
The probit estimates for transfer (loan) giving are shown in Table 8. Comparing the
results in Tables 7 and 8, one can observe remarkable symmetry between the net transfer
recipient and net giver equations. The variables with significant coefficients in the net
transfer giver equation—income (in the pooled estimates), female headship, head’s
schooling, number of workers and head’s unemployment—all but head’s schooling have
reversed signs compared to the corresponding coefficients for net receipts. The major
exception is head’s schooling. In general, better head schooling seems to increase
participation in transfer activity—that is, it is associated with higher probability of giving
as well as receiving. This may be indicative of better networking opportunities for
educated heads. As can be seen in Table 8, we fail to find significance in the loan giving
pooled or random effects probit estimates.
12

Overall, based on the regression results, one can conclude that private transfers serve
risk-sharing purposes in urban Ethiopia while informal transfers do not. Interestingly, the
contrasting results for the two potential mechanisms of insurance could highlight a more
subtle but important distinction between ‘risk sharing’ and ‘consumption smoothing’.
Private transfers respond to income risk proxies and enable risk sharing, thereby
smoothing the consumption of unfortunate households (at least partially). But
consumption smoothing can operate without risk sharing. Informal loans do not respond
to income risk proxies, which rules out their relevance for risk sharing, but they do
respond to indicators of household resources like income and number of workers, and
resource needs like household size. Therefore, households that need to augment current
consumption due to a variety of reasons (e.g. holiday celebrations, purchase of durable
goods, impending ceremonies like weddings, child birth, educational and travel expenses
etc.) and lack the resources to do so could seek loans to fulfill their needs. This is
precisely what is borne out in the descriptive statistics. In Table 2, it is shown that what
can be largely categorized as ‘non-insurance’ items (e.g. nonfood-nondurable
consumption, durable consumption, business expenditure, ceremonial expenses etc.)
constitute about 25% of the reasons for transfer receipts and 50 to 75 percent (unweighted
and weighted statistics) of the reasons for loan receipts. As such, fixed, short term
informal loans smooth consumption without necessarily serving risk-sharing practices.
Excluding Remittances
As shown in Table 2, transfers by nonresident household members mostly in the form of
remittances constitute about 25.8% of all transfers. While this proportion is not that high
per se, a valid argument can be made that the underlying mechanisms driving remittance
receipts are very different from typical inter-household transfers. For once, it can be
argued that most remitters may have informational advantages on the income or other
status of a household relative to neighbors or friends with no kinship to the household.
Therefore, remittances may have a more magnified role in risk-sharing if they are not
hampered by associated information problems of income revelation and verification. In
contrast, if remittances are recurrent (e.g. regularly sent by a migrating spouse or
member) irrespective of the status of a household or sent for specific purposes (e.g. to aid
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educational expenditures on children), they may have very little relevance for risksharing. Since the evidence above suggests that transfers (and not informal loans) seem to
be responsive to outward indicators of household risk and vulnerability, it is useful to
find out how this evidence is affected by the inclusion of remittances as part of total
transfers.
For this, we subtracted the value of any transfers labeled as ‘remittances’ from total
household transfers received or given out. We then rerun the ordered probit and probit
estimates using the leftover amount, which largely comprises only inter-household
transfers. The results are presented in Table 9.
According to the ordered probit estimates in Table 9, the likelihood of net transfer
receipts excluding remittances still rises with female headship and falls with number of
workers and income. The difference with corresponding results in Table 6a is that now
head’s unemployment does not have a statistically significant impact while head’s
schooling lowers the probability of net recipient status. When looking at the probit
estimates in Table 9 though, head’s unemployment still raises the likelihood of transfer
receipts. In comparison, household size does not seem to have any effect in the probit
estimates in Table 9 though it reduced the likelihood of transfer receipts when including
remittances (shown in Table 7). For the net giver probit estimates in Table 9, both female
headship and head’s unemployment lack statistical significance while most other
variables preserve their signs and significance. In general, it can be inferred that the
exclusion of remittances from transfers does not qualitatively change the results of and
conclusions derived from the analysis of total transfers including remittances.
V. Conclusion
Based on nationally representative survey data from poor urban areas, we investigate
whether households use private transfers and informal loans for risk-sharing purposes. A
break-down of reported uses of transfer receipts shows that they are primarily intended
for augmenting food consumption; loan receipts are mostly used for nondurable
consumption, food plus nonfood. However, results from pooled and ordered probit
estimates indicate that transfer receipts, not loans, respond to the presumed income risk
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proxies. We explain loan flows as serving desired consumption goals that are mostly
unrelated to insurance.
As transfers seem to serve risk-sharing purposes, there is a possibility that the provision
of public insurance potentially changes private incentives and simply substitutes private
insurance. In situations of aggregate risk, however, private transfers are not effective and
well-timed public insurance programs would be much warranted. The development of
insurance and financial markets in such economies also provides households, at least
those that may not engage in transfer arrangements for a variety of reasons, alternative
ways to protect consumption during adverse idiosyncratic income shocks.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Income, Transfers and Loans (Proportions, Means
and Standard Deviations)
Variable
Income
Transfers
Transfer status
Any transfer activity
Received transfers
Gave transfers
Transfers amount
Transfers received
Transfers given
Net transfers received
Loans
Loan status
Any loan activity
Received loans
Gave loans
Loans amount
Loans received
Loans given
Net loans received
N

Pooled
416.12
(1441.42)

30.51
23.88
9.90
2073.74
(5496.84)
494.26
(759.39)
1462.73
(4975.02)

33.15
30.19
5.67
272.67
(1901.72)
166.08
(545.54)
219.95
(1668.53)
2054

1994
387.26
(1146.06)

29.01
22.14
9.64
2424.93
(6933.05)
422.81
(555.74)
1710.14
(6150.62)

32.44
29.10
6.68
392.49
(2925.97)
149.49
(613.47)
321.31
(2525.23)
1048

1995
394.10
(1348.20

30.19
23.95
9.55
1245.76
(2019.34)
532.31
(750.78)
819.75
(1977.17)

1997
486.98
(1890.93)

33.23
26.53
10.73
2490.50
(5814.46)
554.84
(985.49)
1808.79
(5350.95)

37.45
34.52
4.97

29.21
26.83
4.92

178.24
(527.29)
224.23
(564.74)
134.56
(558.26)
785

211.82
(503.21)
132.58
(339.52)
172.21
(500.25)
671

Note: Proportions are given in percentages. Amount statistics are conditional on involvement in transfer or
loan activity. Transfers and loans are given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr. N corresponds to total size of the
pooled or yearly samples.
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Table 2: Transfer and Loan Sources
Unweighted
Transfers
Nonresident household member
Relative or friend
Other
N
Loans
Money lender
Friend, relative or neighbor
Informal network
Other
N

Weighted

25.76
73.90
0.34
885

32.26
67.55
0.19
885

4.26
80.72
1.60
13.42
939

5.52
79.90
2.89
11.68
939

Note: Statistics are based on household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights are
transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.

Table 3: Transfer and Loan Reason
Use
Food consumption
Nonfood-nondurable consumption
Durable consumption
Business expenditure
Saving related
Ceremonial expenses
Other
N

Transfers
Unweighted Weighted
68.68
69.28
15.01
8.01
5.79
4.24
1.18
6.48
2.36
6.79
6.97
846

5.20
846

Loans
Unweighted Weighted
47.26
22.36
22.28
25.84
12.59
16.57
11.30
31.32
4.09
2.48
929

2.83
1.08
929

Note: Statistics are based on available household member-level transfer and loan transactions. The weights
are transfer or loan amounts given in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics on Explanatory Variables (Means and Standard
Deviations)
Explanatory Variable
Household size

Pooled
5.70
(2.67)
0.42
49.21
(13.68)
5.42
(5.36)
6.66
(3.47)
1.52
(1.05)
0.22
0.20
0.10
0.14
2504

Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head disabled
Head chronically disabled
Head sick
N

1994
5.86
(2.73)
0.40
48.00
(13.28)
5.53
(5.40)
6.77
(3.58)
1.54
(1.06)
0.21
0.23
0.12
0.16
1048

1995
5.67
(2.68)
0.43
49.00
(13.95)
5.36
(5.31)
5.36
(5.31)
1.50
(1.01)
0.20
0.17
0.08
0.14
785

1997
5.48
(2.58)
0.44
51.33
(13.73)
5.33
(5.34)
5.33
(5.34)
1.51
(1.06)
0.24
0.19
0.08
0.13
671

Table 5: Distribution of Estimation Sample based on Transfer and Credit Receipt
Status
Status
Net givers
Neither net-givers nor net-recipients
Net recipients
N

Count
180
1741
583
2054

Note: Distribution corresponds to the pooled sample.
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Transfers
Frequency
7.19
69.53
23.28
100.00

Count
101
1995
408
2054

Credit
Frequency
4.03
79.67
16.29
100.00

Table 6a: Ordered probit estimates of net transfer and net loan receipts

Variable
Income
Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s age squared
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head sick
Head chronically
disabled

1

2
Log-likelihood
Wald-  (11)
2

Net transfer receipts
Pooled
Random effects
-0.263×10-4*** -0.190×10-4
(2.51)
(0.90)
-0.172×10-1
-0.208×10-1
(1.56)
(1.38)
0.328***
0.412***
(5.31)
(4.70)
-0.110×10-1
-0.118×10-1
(0.96)
(0.75)
0.183×10-3*
0.209×10-3
(1.70)
(1.42)
-0.518×10-2
-0.854×10-2
(0.61)
(0.77)
0.465×10-2
0.650×10-2
(0.44)
(0.46)
-0.766×10-1*** -0.835×10-1**
(2.66)
(2.28)
0.337***
0.435***
(5.19)
(4.79)
0.448×10-1
0.771×10-1
(0.60)
(0.88)
-0.105
-0.907×10-1
(1.00)
(1.11)
-1.626
-1.932
(5.40)
(4.61)
0.693
0.920
(2.31)
(2.20)
-1855.83
-1806.39
181.26
155.28

Net loan receipts
Pooled
Random effects
-0.358×10-4*** -0.373×10-4*
(3.22)
(1.78)
0.345×10-1*** 0.364×10-1***
(2.87)
(2.64)
-1
0.573×10
0.571×10-1
(0.88)
(0.73)
-0.133×10-2
0.194×10-3
(0.11)
(0.01)
-0.311×10-4
-0.485×10-4
(0.29)
(0.36)
-0.160×10-1*
-0.169×10-1*
(1.80)
(1.67)
-0.145×10-1
-0.165×10-1
(1.31)
(1.26)
-0.933×10-1*** -0.986×10-1***
(3.17)
(2.89)
-0.754×10-1
-0.838×10-1
(1.07)
(1.03)
-0.206×10-2
-0.177×10-1
(0.03)
(0.21)
0.195**
0.213**
(2.21)
(2.09)
-2.044
-2.205
(6.31)
(5.80)
0.736
0.847
(2.31)
(2.25)
-1491.76
-1482.06
58.88
44.27

Notes: N=2054. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **shows significance at 5%; *-shows significance at 10%.
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Table 6b: Marginal effects of ordered probit estimates for potential household risk
indicator variables
Net transfer receipts

Net loan receipts

Z h  1

Zh  0

Zh 1

Z h  1

Zh  0

Zh 1

Household size

0.002

0.003

-0.005

-0.003

-0.006

0.008

Female headed

-0.038

-0.061

0.099

-0.005

-0.009

0.014

Head’s schooling

0.001

0.001

-0.002

0.001

0.003

-0.004

Number of workers

0.009

0.013

-0.023

0.008

0.015

-0.023

Head unemployed

-0.035

-0.071

0.107

0.006

0.011

-0.018

Head chronically
disabled

0.012

0.015

-0.026

-0.014

-0.037

0.051

Note: Z h  1 denotes net giver status; Z h  0 denotes neither net recipient nor net giver status;

Z h  1 denotes net recipient status. Marginal effects are based on pooled estimates since they are relatively
more amenable for computation.
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Table 7: Probit estimates of net transfer and net loan receipts
Net transfer recipient
Pooled
Random effects Marginal effects
-0.341×10-4
-0.266×10-4
-0.612×10-5
(1.37)
(0.62)
Household size
-0.411×10-1*** -0.467×10-1**
-0.107×10-1
(3.08)
(2.31)
0.408***
0.598***
0.145
Female headed
(5.64)
(5.11)
Head’s age
-0.644×10-2
-0.616×10-2
-0.142×10-2
(0.51)
(0.31)
Head’s age squared
0.174×10-3
0.218×10-3
0.502×10-4
(1.49)
(1.17)
Head’s schooling
0.198×10-1**
0.255×10-1*
0.587×10-2
(2.04)
(1.72)
Average schooling
0.173×10-1
0.234×10-1
0.539×10-2
(1.40)
(1.27)
-1
Number of workers
-0.158×10
-0.240×10-1
-0.551×10-2
(0.46)
(0.49)
0.381***
0.522***
0.138
Head unemployed
(5.29)
(4.60)
0.110
0.179*
Head sick
0.439×10-1
(1.35)
(1.65)
-0.159
Head chronically disabled -0.133
-0.342×10-1
(1.35)
(1.20)
-1.120***
-1.671***
Constant
(3.31)
(3.03)
-1274.14
-1220.77
Log-likelihood
163.37
107.37
2
Wald-  (11)
Variable
Income

Pooled
-0.192×10-3***
(2.74)
0.408×10-1***
(2.98)
0.308×10-1
(0.40)
-0.787×10-2
(0.58)
-0.649×10-6
(0.01)
-0.113×10-1
(1.09)
-0.831×10-2
(0.63)
-0.793×10-1**
(2.08)
-0.849×10-1
(1.02)
0.228×10-1
(0.26)
0.193*
(1.89)
-0.557
(1.53)
-1088.25
41.85

Net loan recipient
Random effects Marginal effects
-0.212×10-3*** -0.418×10-4
(2.85)
0.453×10-1*** 0.894×10-2
(2.67)
0.274×10-1
0.541×10-2
(0.28)
-0.691×10-2
-0.136×10-2
(0.38)
-0.263×10-4
-0.519×10-5
(0.15)
-0.138×10-1
-0.273×10-2
(1.07)
-0.103×10-1
-0.203×10-2
(0.63)
-0.839×10-1*
-0.165×10-1
(1.85)
-0.987×10-1
-0.188×10-1
(0.97)
0.846×10-2
0.167×10-2
(0.08)
0.205*
0.444×10-1
(1.71)
-0.688
(1.44)
-1074.59
37.47

Notes: N=2054. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer receipt=1 if net transfers received >0, zero otherwise; (b) for loans: net loan receipt=1 if net
loans received >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows
significance at 10%. Marginal effects are based on random effects estimates.
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Table 8: Probit Estimates of net transfer and net loan giving

Variable
Income

Pooled
0.290×10-4*
(1.92)
Household size
-0.183×10-1
(0.95)
-0.228**
Female headed
(2.08)
Head’s age
0.274×10-2
(0.13)
Head’s age squared
-0.596×10-4
(0.28)
Head’s schooling
0.416×10-1***
(3.08)
Average schooling
0.250×10-1
(1.32)
0.162***
Number of workers
(4.18)
-0.279**
Head unemployed
(2.10)
0.133
Head sick
(1.06)
Head chronically disabled 0.112×10-1
(0.07)
-2.014***
Constant
(3.91)
-575.14
Log-likelihood
114.91
2
Wald-  (11)

Net transfer giver
Random effects
0.288×10-4
(1.15)
-0.167×10-1
(0.81)
-0.245**
(1.98)
0.166×10-2
(0.07)
-0.503×10-4
(0.22)
0.463×10-1***
(3.09)
0.257×10-1
(1.24)
0.169***
(3.58)
-0.301**
(1.99)
0.130
(0.94)
0.276×10-1
(0.16)
-2.179***
(3.69)
-573.01
95.23

Marginal effects Pooled
0.235×10-5
-0.691×10-5
(0.38)
-0.136×10-2
-0.116×10-1
(0.56)
-1
-0.114
-0.194×10
(1.00)
-3
0.136×10
-0.167×10-1
(0.77)
-0.411×10-5
0.113×10-3
(0.54)
0.378×10-2
0.163×10-1
(1.02)
0.210×10-2
0.284×10-1
(1.42)
0.138×10-1
0.737×10-1
(1.55)
-0.213×10-1
-0.207×10-2
(0.02)
0.116×10-1
0.955×10-1
(0.68)
-0.235
0.230×10-2
(1.22)
-1.542***
(2.83)
-407.276
35.58

Net loan giver
Random effects
-0.936×10-5
(0.19)
-0.117×10-1
(0.48)
-0.123
(0.88)
-0.021
(0.83)
0.141×10-3
(0.58)
0.161×10-1
(0.94)
0.322×10-1
(1.34)
0.834×10-1
(1.47)
0.004
(0.03)
0.115
(0.72)
-0.310
(1.31)
-1.642***
(2.58)
-405.60
25.67

Marginal effects
-0.500×10-6
-0.625×10-3
-0.648×10-2
-0.111×10-2
0.750×10-5
0.860×10-3
0.172×10-2
0.445×10-2
0.230×10-3
0.666×10-2
-0.130×10-1

Notes: N=2054. Dependent variable is (a) for transfers: net transfer given=1 if net transfers given >0, zero otherwise (b) for loans: net loan given=1 if net loans
given >0, zero otherwise. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows
significance at 10%. Marginal effects are based on random effects estimates.
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Table 9: Ordered Probit and Probit Estimates of Net Transfer Receipts, Remittances Excluded
Ordered Probit Estimates
Pooled

Variable
Income
Household size
Female headed
Head’s age
Head’s age squared
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head sick
Head chronically disabled

1
2
Log-likelihood
Wald-  (11)
2

-0.333×10-4**
(2.32)
0.778×10-2
(0.63)
0.174***
(2.51)
-0.141×10-1
(1.13)
0.139×10-3
(1.22)
-0.247×10-1***
(2.69)
-0.136×10-1
(1.16)
-0.109***
(3.23)
0.103
(1.38)
0.364×10-1
(0.43)
0.170
(0.02)
-1.988
(5.87)
0.917
(2.73)
-1342.26
104.52

Random Effects
-0.327×10-4*
(1.65)
0.710×10-2
(0.52)
0.183**
(2.37)
-0.149×10-1
(1.08)
0.147×10-3
(1.14)
-0.270×10-1***
(2.72)
-0.137×10-1
(1.07)
-0.109***
(3.29)
0.116
(1.45)
0.417×10-1
(0.48)
-0.745×10-2
(0.07)
-2.104
(5.68)
0.975
(2.67)
-1339.30
107.27

Probit Estimates
Net Recipient
Pooled
Random Effects
-0.392×10-4
-0.396×10-4
(1.07)
(0.66)
-0.220×10-1
-0.222×10-1
(1.22)
(1.20)
0.242***
0.249***
(2.50)
(2.47)
-0.167×10-1
-0.170×10-1
(1.04)
(1.00)
0.159×10-3
0.162×10-3
(1.08)
(1.03)
0.146×10-1
0.147×10-1
(1.12)
(1.09)
-0.175×10-1
-0.177×10-1
(1.07)
(1.05)
-2
0.225×10
0.262×10-2
(0.05)
(0.06)
0.191***
0.196***
(1.96)
(1.98)
0.108
0.111
(1.02)
(1.02)
0.882×10-3
-0.214×10-2
(0.01)
(0.02)

Net Giver
Pooled
Random Effects
0.350×10-4**
0.354×10-4
(2.14)
(1.58)
-0.292×10-1*
-0.289×10-1
(1.67)
(1.53)
-0.134
-0.137
(1.37)
(1.25)
0.654×10-2
0.611×10-2
(0.35)
(0.29)
-0.946×10-4
-0.895×10-4
(0.51)
(0.44)
0.501×10-1***
0.557×10-1***
(4.10)
(4.02)
0.127×10-1
0.123×10-1
(0.76)
(0.66)
0.181***
0.188***
(5.05)
(4.36)
-0.403×10-1
-0.504×10-1
(0.37)
(0.41)
0.506×10-1
0.469×10-1
(0.44)
(0.37)
0.228×10-1
0.380×10-1
(0.16)
(0.24)

638.44
30.76

-690.01
136.73

-638.27
29.84

-688.05
107.79

Notes: N=2504. Asymptotic |t| statistics are shown in parentheses. ***-shows significance at 1% level; **-shows significance at 5%; *-shows significance at
10%.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable
Net transfer receipts
Net loan receipts
Income

Household size
Female headed
Head’s schooling
Average schooling
Number of workers
Head unemployed
Head disabled
Head chronically
disabled
Head sick

Definition/Construction
Gross private transfers received minus gross private transfers given
Total loans taken-repayments made-loans given+ repayments received
Pre-transfer income earned from one or more of the following sources:
wage/salary employment, informal female business, informal child
business
Number of household members currently residing in the household
Dummy variable=1 if head is female
Years of schooling completed by head
Average years of schooling completed by all household members above
the age of 15
Number of household members involved in income-earning activity
Dummy variable=1 if head is unemployed
Dummy variable=1 if head reported having a disability
Dummy variable=1 if head’s reported disability is chronic (e.g. very
poor or complete loss of eye sight)
Dummy variable=1 if head reported experiencing illness in the month
prior to the survey

Note: Transactions considered include both cash and in-kind transfers and loans. Transfers, loans and income are
all reported in real 1994 Ethiopian birr.

27

